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Abstract Crowdsourcing successfully strives to become a widely used means of col-
lecting large-scale scientific corpora. Many research fields, including Information Retrie-
val, rely on this novel way of data acquisition. However, it seems to be undermined by a
significant share of workers that are primarily interested in producing quick generic
answers rather than correct ones in order to optimise their time-efficiency and, in turn, earn
more money. Recently, we have seen numerous sophisticated schemes of identifying such
workers. Those, however, often require additional resources or introduce artificial limi-
tations to the task. In this work, we take a different approach by investigating means of
a priori making crowdsourced tasks more resistant against cheaters.
Keywords Crowdsourcing  User experiments  Stability  Human factors
1 Introduction
Many scientific fields including information retrieval, artificial intelligence, machine translation
or natural language processing rely heavily on large-scale corpora for system building, training
and evaluation. The traditional approach to acquiring these data collections is employing human
experts to annotate or create the relevant material. A well-known example from the area of
information retrieval is the series of extensive corpora created in the context of the NIST’s Text
REtrieval Conference (TREC) (Harman 1993). Since the manual creation of such resources
typically requires substantial amounts of time and money there have long been advances into
using automatically generated or extracted resources (Riloff 1996; Lesher and Sanelli 2000;
Soboroff et al. 2001; Amitay et al. 2004). While there are several promising directions and
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methods that are reported to correlate well with human judgements, for many applications that
require high precision, human judgements are still necessary (Marcus et al. 1993).
Especially in novel or niche areas of research for which there are little or no existing
resources that could be re-used, the demand for an alternative way of data acquisition
becomes apparent. With the advent of commercial crowdsourcing, a new means of satisfying
this need for large-scale human annotations emerged. Starting in 2005, Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk 2011) and others provide platforms on which task requesters can reach a large
number of freelance employees to solve human intelligence tasks (HITs). The payment is
typically done on micro level, e.g., a few US cents per quickly solvable HIT. This process is
now widely accepted and represents the basis for data collection, resource annotation or
validation in many recent research publications (Ambati et al. 2010; Kittur et al. 2008).
Over the years crowdsourcing became substantially more popular among both requesters
and workers. As a consequence, the relatively small initial crowd of workers that was
mainly attracted by the prospect of completing odd or entertaining tasks as a diversion,
changed. Nowadays, the number of users who are mainly attracted by the monetary reward
represents a significant share of the crowd’s workforce (Baio 2008; Kaufmann et al. 2011;
Ross et al. 2010). At the same time we observe a significant share of cheaters entering the
market. Those workers try to maximise their financial gains by submitting quick generic,
non-reflected answers that, in turn, serve for weak or altogether compromised corpus
quality. In response to this trend, research work based on crowdsourcing nowadays has to
pay careful attention to monitoring result quality. The accepted way of addressing cheat
submissions in crowdsourcing is the use of high quality gold standard data or inter-annotator
agreement ratios to check on and if necessary reject deceivers. In this work we present an
alternative approach by designing HITs that are less attractive for cheaters. Based on the
experience gained from several previous crowdsourcing tasks and a number of dedicated
experiments, this work aims to quantify the share of deceivers as well as to identify criteria
and methods to make tasks more robust against this new form of annotation taint.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: Sect. 2 gives an overview of related
work in the domain of crowdsourcing. In Sect. 3, we analyse commonly observed cheating
strategies in crowdsourcing environments. Section 4 describes a number of experiments
that were conducted in order to measure the current extent of crowdsourcing scam as well
as the remedial effect of several design criteria. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes with a summary
of our findings and an outlook on future directions in countering cheaters and thus pre-
serving result quality.
2 Related work
Despite the fact that crowdsourcing is being widely used to create and aggregate data
collections for scientific and industrial use, the current amount of research work dedicated
to methodological evaluations of crowdsourcing is relatively limited. One of the early
studies by Sorokin and Forsyth in (2008) investigated the possibility of using crowd-
sourcing for image annotation.
They found an interesting non-monotonic dependency between the assigned monetary
reward per HIT and the observed result quality. While very low pay resulted in sloppy
work, gradually increasing the reward improved annotation quality up to a point where
further increases even deteriorated performance due to attracting more cheaters. In the
same year, Kittur et al. (2008) published their influential overview on the importance of
task formulation to obtaining good results. Their main conclusion was that a task should be
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given in such a way, that cheating takes approximately the same time as faithfully com-
pleting it. The authors additionally underline the importance of clearly verifiable questions
in order to reject deceivers.
In the course of the following year, several independent research groups studied the
performance of experts versus non-experts for various natural language processing tasks
such as paraphrasation, translation or sentiment analysis (Snow et al. 2008; Hsueh et al.
2009). The unanimous finding, also confirmed by Alonso and Mizzaro (2009), was, that a
single expert is typically more reliable than a single non-expert. However, aggregating the
results of several cheap non-experts, the performance of an expensive professional can be
equalled at significantly lower cost. In the same year, Little et al. (2009) released TurkIt, a
framework for iterative programming of crowdsourcing tasks. In their evaluation, the
authors mention relatively low numbers of cheaters. This finding is somewhat conflicting
with most publications in the field, that report higher figures. We suspect that there is a
strong connection between the type of task at hand and the type of workers attracted to it.
In this work we will carefully investigate this dependency through a series of experiments.
There is a line of work dedicated to studying HIT design in order to facilitate task
understanding and worker efficiency. Examples are Khanna et al. (2010)’s investigation of
the influence of HIT interface design on Indian workers’ ability to successfully finish a HIT
or Grady and Lease’s (2010) study of human factors in HIT design. The interface-related
study in Sect. 4.3 inspects a very different angle by using interface design as a means of
making cheating less efficient and therefore less tempting.
We can conclude that there are numerous good publications that detail tailor-made
schemes to identify and reject cheaters in various crowdsourcing scenarios. Snow et al.
(2008) do not treat cheaters explicitly, but propose modelling systematic worker bias and
subsequently correcting for it. For their sentiment analysis of political blog posts, Hsueh
et al. (2009) rely on a combination of gold standard labels and majority voting to ensure
result quality. Soleymani and Larson 2010) use a two-stage process. In a first round, the
authors offer a pilot HIT as recruitment and manually invite well-performing workers for
the actual task. Hirth et al. (2010) describe a sophisticated workflow in which one (or even
potentially several) subsequent crowdsourcing step is used in order to check on the quality
of crowdsourced results. In her recent work, Gabriella Kazai discusses how the HIT setup
influences result quality, for example through pay rate, worker qualification or worker type
(Kazai 2011; Kazai et al. 2011).
In this article, we take a different approach from the state of the art by (1) Aiming at
discouraging cheaters rather than detecting them. While there is extensive work on the
posterior identification and rejection of cheaters, we deem these methods sub-optimal as
they still bind resources such as time or money. Instead, we try to find out what makes a
HIT look appealing to cheaters and subsequently aim to remedy these aspects. (2) While
there are many publications also detailing the authors’ cheater detection schemes, we are
not aware of comprehensive works on cheat robustness that are applicable to a wide range
of HIT types. By giving a broad overview of frequently encountered adversarial strategies
as well as established countermeasures, we hope to close this gap.
3 How to cheat
Before proceeding to our experimentally supported inspection of various cheat countering
strategies, we will spend some thought on the nature of cheating on large-scale crowd-
sourcing platforms. The insights presented in this section are derived from related work,
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discussions with peers, as well as our own experience as HIT providers. They present, what
we believe is an overview of the most frequently encountered adversarial strategies in the
commercial crowdsourcing field. While one could theorize about many more potential
exploits, especially motivated by the information security domain (e.g., Pfleeger and
Pfleeger 2007; Moore et al. 2001), we try to concentrate on giving an account of the main
strategies HIT designers have to face regularly.
As we will show in more detail, the cheaters’ methods are typically straightforward to
spot for humans, but, given the massive HIT volume, such a careful manual inspection is
not always feasible. Cheating as a holistic activity can be assumed to follow a breadth-first
strategy in that the group of cheating workers will explore a wide range of naive cheats and
move on to a different HIT if those prove to be futile. When dealing with cheating in
crowdsourcing, it is important to take into consideration the workers’ different underlying
motivations for taking up HITs in the first place (Ipeirotis 2010b). We believe that there are
two major types of workers with fundamentally different motivations for offering their
work force. Entertainment-driven workers primarily seek diversion by taking up inter-
esting, possibly challenging HITs. For this group the financial reward plays a minor role.
The second group are money-driven workers. These workers are mainly attracted by
monetary incentives. We expect the latter group to contain more cheating individuals as an
optimization of time efficiency and, subsequently, an increased financial reward, is clearly
appealing given their motivation. In this work, we also regard any form of automated HIT
submission, i.e., bots, scripts, etc. to originate from money-driven workers. We could get
an interesting insight into the organization of the money-driven crowdsourcing subculture
when running a HIT that involved filling a survey with personal information (Eickhoff
et al. 2011) (See Fig. 4 in the Appendix). For this HIT we received multiple submissions
by unique workers that contained largely contradictory statements. We suspect these
workers to be organised in large-scale offices from where multiple individuals connect to
the platform under the same worker id. While this rather anecdotal observation is not
central to our work and demands further evidence in order to be quantifiable, we consider it
an interesting one, worth sharing with the research community.
Our following overview of cheating approaches will be organised according to the types
of HITs and quality control mechanisms they are aimed at.
3.1 Closed class questions
Closed class questions are probably the most frequently used HIT elements. They require
the worker to choose from a limited, pre-defined list of options. Common examples of
this category include radio buttons, multiple choice question, check boxes and sliders.
There are two widely-encountered cheating strategies targeting closed-class tasks:
(1) Arbitrarily picked answers can often easily be rejected by using good gold standard
data or by inspecting agreement with redundant submissions by multiple workers, either
in terms of majority votes or more sophisticated combination schemes (Dawid and Skene
1979). (2) Some clever cheaters may learn from previous HITs and come up with
educated guesses based on the answer distribution underlying the HIT. An example could
be the typically sparsely distributed relevance in web search scenarios for which a clever
cheater might learn that arbitrarily selecting only a very small percentage of documents
closely resembles meaningful judgements. This is often addressed by introducing a
number of very easy to answer gold standard awareness questions. A user that fails to
answer those questions can be immediately rejected as he is clearly not trying to produce
sensible results.
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3.2 Open class questions
Open questions allow workers to provide less restricted answers or perform creative tasks.
The most common example of this class are text fields but it potentially includes draw
boxes, file uploads or similar. Focussing on the widely used text fields, there are three
different forms of cheats: (1) Leaving the field blank can be disabled during HIT design.
(2) Entering generic text blocks is easily detectable if the same text is used repeatedly. (3)
Providing unique (sometimes even domain-specific) portions of natural language text
copied from the Web is very hard to detect automatically.
3.3 Internal quality control
Most current large-scale crowdsourcing platforms collect internal statistics of the workers’
reliability in order to fend off cheaters. Reliability is, to the best of our knowledge,
measured by all major platforms in terms of the worker’s share of previously accepted
submissions. There are two major drawbacks of this approach: (1) Previous acceptance
rates fail to account for the high share of submissions that are uniformly accepted by the
HIT provider and are post-processed and filtered, steps, to which the platform’s reputation
system has no access. (2) Previous acceptance rates are prone to gaming strategies such as
rank boosting (Ipeirotis 2010a) in which the worker simultaneously acts as a HIT provider.
He can then artificially boost his reliability by requesting and submitting small HITs. This
gaming scheme is very cheaply implementable as the cycle only loses the service fee
deducted by the crowdsourcing platform.
In addition to these theoretical considerations concerning the shortcomings of current
quality control mechanisms, Sect. 4.4 will show an empirical evaluation backing the
assumption that we need better built-in quality measures than prior acceptance rates.
3.4 External quality control
Some very interactive HIT types may require more sophisticated technical means than
offered by most crowdsourcing platforms. During one of our early experiments, we dealt
with this situation by redirecting workers to an external, less restricted web page on which
they would complete the actual task and receive a confirmation code to be entered on the
original crowdsourcing platform. Despite this openly announced completion check,
workers tried to issue made-up confirmation codes, to resubmit previously generated codes
multiple times or to submit several empty tasks and claim that they did not get a code after
task completion. While such attempts are easily fended off, they offer a good display of
deceiver strategies. They will commonly try out a series of naive exploits and move on to
the next task if they do not succeed.
4 Experiments
After our discussion of adversarial approaches and common remedies, this section will
give a quantitative experimental overview of various cheating robustness criteria of
crowdsourcing tasks. The starting point of our evaluation are two very different HITs that
we originally requested throughout 2010 and that showed substantially different cheat
rates. The first task is a straightforward binary relevance assessment between pairs of web
pages and queries. The second task asked the workers to judge web pages according to
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their suitability for children of different age groups and to fill a brief survey on their
experience in guiding children’s web search (Eickhoff et al. 2011). Examples of both tasks
can be found in the Appendix.
All experiments were run through CrowdFlower1 in 2010 and 2011. The platform
incorporates the notion of ‘‘channels’’ to forward HITS to third party platforms. To achieve
broad coverage and results representative of the crowdsourcing market, we chose all
available channels, which at that time were Amazon Mechanical Turk2 (AMT), Gambit3,
SamaSource4 as well as the GiveWork smartphone application jointly run by Samasource
and CrowdFlower. Table 1 shows the overall distribution of received submissions
according to the channels from which they originated. The figures are reported across all
HITs collected for this study, as there were no significant differences in distribution
between HIT types. The vast majority of submissions came from AMT. We are not are not
aware of the reason why we did not receive any submissions from the GiveWork app. HITs
were offered in units of 10 at a time with initial batch sizes of 50 HITS. Each HIT was
issued to at least 5 independent workers. Unless stated differently, all HITs were offered to
unrestricted audiences with the sole qualification of having achieved 95% prior HIT
acceptance, the default setting on most platforms. The monetary reward per HIT was set to
2 US cents per relevance assessment and 5 US cents per filled web page suitability survey.
We did not change the reward throughout this work. Previous work, e.g., by Harris (2011),
has shown the influence of different financial incentive models on result quality. Statistical
significance of results was determined using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test with a\ 0.05.
A key aspect of our evaluation is identifying cheaters. There is a wide range of indi-
cators for this purpose, including: (1) Agreement with trusted gold standard data can be
used to measure the general quality of an answer. (2) Agreement with other workers
enables us to identify hard tasks on which even honest workers occasionally fail. (3) HIT
completion times (either compared per HIT or HIT type) give an estimate of how much
effort the worker put into the task. (4) Simple task awareness questions that are correctly
and unambiguously answerable for every worker can be introduced to identify distracted or
cheating individuals. Mistakes on this kind of question are typically penalized heavily in
cheater detection schemes.5 The concrete scheme chosen in this work will be formally
detailed in the following section.
Our analysis of methods to increase cheating robustness was conducted along four
research questions: (1) How does the concrete task type influence the number of observed
cheaters? (2) Does interface design affect the share of cheaters? (3) Can we reduce
Table 1 Submission
distribution for all HITs
Channel Absolute Relative share (%)
Amazon mechanical turk 4285 85
Samasource 454 9
Gambit 303 6
GiveWork 0 0
1 http://www.crowdflower.com
2 http://www.mturk.com
3 http://getgambit.com/
4 http://samasource.org/
5 The original suggestion of this trick resulted from personal communication between the authors, Mark
Sanderson and William Webber.
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fraudulent tendencies by explicitly filtering the crowd? (4) Is there a connection between
the size of HIT batches and observed cheater rates?
4.1 What qualifies a cheater?
Before beginning our inspection of different strategies to fend off cheaters in crowd-
sourcing scenarios, let us dedicate some further consideration to the definition of cheaters.
Following our previous HIT experience we can extend the worker classification scheme by
Kittur et al. (2008) to identify several dysfunctional worker types. Incapable workers do
not fulfil all essential requirements needed to create high quality results. Malicious workers
try to invalidate experiment results by submitting wrong answers on purpose. Distracted
workers do not pay full attention to the HIT which often results in poor quality. The source
of this distraction will vary across workers and may be of external or intrinsic nature. The
exclusively money-driven cheater introduced in Sect. 3 falls into the third category, as he
would be capable of producing correct results but is distracted by the need to achieve the
highest possible time-efficiency. As a consequence, we postulate the following formal
definition of cheaters for all subsequent experiments in this work:
Definition 1 A cheater is a worker who fails to correctly answer simple task awareness
questions or who is unable to achieve better than random performance given a HIT of
reasonable difficulty.
In the concrete case of our experiments we measure agreement as a simple majority vote
across a population of at least 5 workers per HIT. Disagreeing with this majority decision
for at least 50% of the questions asked will flag a worker as a cheater. Additionally, we
inject task awareness questions that require the worker to indicate whether the resource in
question is written in a non-English language (each set of 10 judgements that a worker
would complete at a time would contain one known non-English page). Awareness in this
context represents that the worker actually visited the web page that he is asked to judge.
Failing to answer this very simple question will also result in being considered a cheater.
The cheater status is computed on task level (i.e., across a set of 10 judgements in our
setting) in order to result in comparable reliability. Computing cheater status on batch level
or even globally would serve for very strict labels as a single missed awareness question
would brand someone a cheater even if the remainder of his work in the batch or the entire
collection were valuable. Our approach can be considered lenient as cheaters are ‘‘par-
doned’’ at the end of each task. Our decision is additionally motivated by the fact that the
aim of this study is to gauge the proportion of cheaters attracted by a given HIT design
rather than achieving high confidence at identifying individuals to be rejected in further
iterations. At the same time, we are confident that a decision based on 10 binary awareness
questions and the averaged agreement across 10 relevance judgements produces reliable
results that are hard to bypass for actual cheaters.
This approach appears reasonable as also it focuses on workers that are distracted to the
point of dysfunctionality. In order to not be flagged as a cheater, a worker has to produce at
least mediocre judgements and not fail on any of the awareness questions. Given the
relative simplicity of our experiments we do not expect incapability to be a major hin-
drance for well-meaning workers in our setting. Truly malicious workers, finally, can be
seen as a rather theoretical class given the large scale of popular crowdsourcing platforms
on the web. This worker type is expected to be more predominant in small-scale envi-
ronments where their activity has higher detrimental impact. We believe that our definition
is applicable in a wide range of crowdsourcing scenarios due to its generality and
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flexibility. The concrete threshold value of agreement to be reached as well as an appro-
priate type of awareness question should be selected depending on the task at hand.
4.2 Task-dependent evaluation
As a first step into understanding the dynamics of cheating on crowdsourcing platforms, we
compare the baseline cheater rate for the two previously introduced HIT types. The main
differences between the two tasks are task novelty and complexity. Plain relevance
judgements are frequently encountered on crowdsourcing platforms and can be assumed to
be well-known to a great number of workers. Our suitability survey, on the other hand, is a
novel task that requires significantly more consideration. Directly comparing absolute
result quality across tasks would not be meaningful due to the very different task-inherent
difficulty. Table 2 shows the observed share of cheaters for both tasks before and after
using gold standard data.
We can find a substantially higher cheater rate for the straightforward relevance
assessment. The use of gold standard data reduced cheater rates for both tasks by a
comparable degree (27.3% relative reduction for the suitability HIT and 24% for the
relevance assessments). With respect to our first research question, we note that more
complex tasks that require creativity and abstract thinking attract a significantly smaller
percentage of cheaters. We assume this observation to be explained by the interplay of two
processes: (1) Money-driven workers prefer simple tasks that can be easily automated over
creative ones. (2) Entertainment-seekers can be assumed to be more attracted towards
novel, enjoyable and challenging tasks. For all further experiments in this work we will
exclusively inspect the relevance assessment task as it has a higher overall cheater rate that
is assumed to more clearly illustrate the impact of the various evaluated factors.
4.3 Interface-dependent evaluation
We have shown how innovative tasks draw a higher share of faithful workers that are
assumed to be primarily interested in diversion. However, in the daily crowdsourcing
routine, many tasks are of rather straightforward nature. In this section, we will evaluate
how interface design can influence the observed cheater rate even for well-known tasks
such as image tagging or relevance assessments. Traditional interface design commonly
tries to not distract the user from the task at hand (Shneiderman 1997). As a consequence,
the number of context changes is kept as low as possible to allow focused and efficient
working. While this approach is widely accepted in environments with trusted users,
crowdsourcing may require a different treatment. A smooth interaction with a low number
of context changes makes a HIT prone to automation, either directly by a money-driven
worker or by scripts and bots. We investigate this connection at the example of our
relevance assessment task.
Table 3 shows the results of this comparison. In the first step, we present the workers
with batches of 10 web page/query pairs using gold standard data. In order to keep the
Table 2 Task-dependent share
of cheaters before and after using
gold standard data
Task Before gold (%) After gold (%)
Suitability 2.2 1.6
Relevance 37.3 28.4
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number of context changes to a minimum we asked the workers to visit a single web
page6 and create relevance judgements for that page given 10 different queries. The
resulting share of cheaters turns out to be substantial (28.4%). Now we increase the
amount of interaction in the HIT by requiring the worker to create 10 judgements for
query/document pairs in which we keep the query constant and require visiting 10 unique
web pages. Under this new setting the worker is required to make significantly more
context changes between different web pages. While in a controlled environment with
trusted annotators this step would be counterproductive, we see a significant relative
decline of 23% to a proportion of 21.9% cheaters. In a final step, we issue batches of 10
randomly drawn query/document pairs. As a result, the proportion of cheaters decreases
by another 15 to 18.5%. The general HIT interface remains unchanged from the original
example shown in Fig. 3, only the combinations of query/document pairs vary. With
respect to our second research question, we find that greater variability and more context
changes discourage deceivers as the task appears less susceptible to automation or
cheating, and therefore less profitable.
4.4 Crowd filtering
In this section, we will address our third research question by inspecting a number of
commonly used filtering strategies to narrow down the pool of eligible workers that can
take up a HIT. In order to make for a fair comparison, we will regard two settings as
the basis of our juxtaposition: (1) The initial cheat-prone relevance assessment setup
with 10 queries and 1 document, using gold standard verification questions. (2) The
previous best performance that was achieved using gold standard verification sets as
well as randomly drawn query/document pairs as described in Sect. 4.3 Please note that
the crowd filtering experiment were exclusively run on AMT as not all previously
used platforms offer the same filtering functionalities. The HITs created in this section
are not shown in Table 1, as they would artificially boost AMT’s prominence even
further.
4.4.1 By prior performance
In the course of this document we argued that the widely used prior acceptance rates are
not an optimal means of assessing worker reliability. In order to evaluate the viability of
our hypothesis we increase the required threshold accuracy to 99% (The default setting is
Table 3 Interface-dependent
percentage of cheaters for
variable queries, variable
documents and fully
variable pairs
Interface type Observed
cheater rate (%)
Variable queries 28.4
Variable documents 21.9
Both variable 18.5
6 The pages used in this study originate from the ClueWeb’09 collection (http://lemurproject.org/
clueweb09.php/) and the queries and gold standard judgements for topics 51-57 from NIST’s TREC 2010
Web track adhoc task (Clarke 2009).
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95%). Given a robust reliability measure, this, at least seemingly very strict standard
should result in highest result quality.
4.4.2 By origin
Offering the HIT exclusively to inhabitants of certain countries or regions is a further
commonly-encountered strategy for fending off cheaters and sloppy workers. Following
our model of money-driven and entertainment-driven workers we assume that offering our
HITs to developed countries should result in lower cheater rates. In order to evaluate this
assumption we repeat the identical HIT that was previously offered unrestrictedly, on a
pure US crowd.
4.4.3 By recruitment
Recruitment (sometimes also called qualification) HITs are a further means of a priori
narrowing down the group of workers. In a multi-step process, workers are presented with
preparatory HITs. Workers that achieve a given level of result quality are eligible to take
up the actual HIT. In our case we presented workers with the identical type of HIT that was
evaluated later and accepted every worker that did not qualify as a cheater (according to
Definition 1) for the final experiment.
4.4.4 Results
The first two columns of Table 4 shows an overview of the three evaluated filtering
dimensions. Raising the threshold of prior acceptance from the 95% default to 99% only
gradually lowered the observed cheater rate. Filtering depending on worker origin was
able to cut cheater rates down to less than a third of the originally observed 28.4%.
However, this substantial reduction comes at a cost. The run time of the whole batch
increased from 5 hours to slightly under one week as we limit the crowd size. Providers of
time-sensitive or very large HIT batches may have to consider this trade-off carefully.
The introduction of a recruitment step prior to the actual HIT was able to reduce the
cheater rate, however, the cheat reduction vs. increase in completion time is worse than
for origin-based filtering. To further confirm and understand these trends, columns 3 and 4
of the same table display the same statistics for the varied HIT setting in which we
assigned random query/document pairs. In general, the effect of filtering turned out to be
largely independent of the previously applied interface changes. The relative merit of the
applied methods was found to be comparable for both the initial and the high-variance
interface.
Table 4 Effect of crowd filtering on cheater rate and batch processing time
Filtering method Cheaters
(initial) (%)
Time
(initial) (h)
Cheaters
(varied) (%)
Time
(varied) (h)
Baseline 28.4 3.2 18.5 5.2
99% prior acc. 26.2 3.8 17.7 7.6
US only 8.4 140 5.4 160
Recruitment 19 145 12.2 144
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The conclusion towards our third research question is twofold: (1) We have seen how
prior crowd filtering can greatly reduce the proportion of cheaters. This narrowing down of
the workforce may however result in longer completion times. (2) Additionally, we could
confirm the assumption that a worker’s previous task acceptance rate can not be seen as a
robust stand-alone predictor of his reliability.
4.5 The influence of batch sizes
Crowdsourced HITs are typically issued on large scale in order to collect significant
amounts of data. Currently, HIT batch sizes are typically adjusted according to practical
or organizational needs but with little heed to result quality. Wang et al. (2011) gave a
first intuition of an instrumental use of batch sizes by showing that small batches typi-
cally have longer per-HIT completion times than large ones. We assume that this ten-
dency is explained by large HIT batches being more attractive for workers interested
time-efficiency. A batch of only 2 HITs has a relatively large overhead of reading and
understanding the task instructions before completing actual work. For large batches,
workers have a significantly higher reuse potential. The same holds true for cheating.
Investing time into finding a way to game a 5-HIT batch is far less attractive than doing
the same for a batch of 100 HITs. As a consequence, we expect large HIT batches to
attract relatively higher cheater rates than small batches. Previously, all HITs were
offered in batches of 50. In order to evaluate our hypothesis we issued several batches of
relevance assessment HITs (see Fig. 3 in the Appendix) and compared the observed
cheater rates depending on the batch size. For each setting, we collected judgements for
100 query/document pairs. Except for the batch size, all experiment parameters were kept
at the settings described in Sect. 4. Batches were requested one at a time. Only after a
batch’s completion would we publish the following one. In this way we aim to avoid
giving the impression that there was a large amount of similar HITs available to be
preyed on by cheaters. As a consequence, we do not expect major external effects caused
Fig. 1 Observed percentage of cheaters for HIT batches of variable size
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by the resulting higher number of batches offered as they are never available at the same
time. Figure 1 shows the result of this comparison. The figure represents the mean
observed cheater rate for each batch size s across a population of n ¼ 100s batches. We can
note a statistically significant (using Wilcoxon signed Rank test with a\ 0.05) increase
in cheating activity for batch sizes of at least 10 HITs. As a consequence of determining
cheater status at task level, we do not expect any influence of the batch size on the
confidence of our cheater detection since the number of HITs per task remained
unchanged across batch size settings.
As a further piece of evidence, let us investigate how the cheater rate develops within a
batch as HIT submissions arrive. The previously made observations would imply that, as
the batch approaches completion, the arrival of new cheaters should become less frequent
as the batch of available HITs shrinks in size. To pursue this intuition, workers were
ordered according to their time of first submission to the batch. Subsequently, we deter-
mined the maximum likelihood estimate of encountering a new cheater, p(c) given an
original batch size and a degree of completion as:
pðcjs; xÞ ¼ jCs;xjjWs;xj
where jCs;xj is the number of new cheaters observed for size s at degree of completion x,
and jWs;xj is the overall number of new workers arriving at that time. Figure 2 shows the
resulting distributions. For significantly large s, we can clearly see our intuition confirmed.
As the number of remaining HITs declines, new cheaters are observed less and less
frequently. For settings of s \ 25 the distributions are near uniform and we could not
determine significant changes over time.
With respect to our fourth research question, we conclude that larger batches indeed
attract more cheaters as they offer greater potential of automation or repetition. This
finding holds interesting implications for HIT designers, who may consider splitting up
large batches into multiple smaller ones.
Fig. 2 Likelihood of observing new cheaters as batches approach completion
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5 Discussion and conclusion
In this work we investigated various ways of making crowdsourcing HITs more robust
against cheat submissions. Many state of the art approaches to deal with cheating rely on
posterior result filtering. We choose a different focus by trying to design and formulate
HITs in such a way that they are less attractive for cheaters. The factors evaluated in this
article are: (1) The HIT type. (2) The HIT interface. (3) The composition of the worker
crowd. (4) The size of HIT batches.
Based on a range of experiments, we conclude that cheaters are less frequently
encountered in novel tasks that involve creativity and abstract thinking. Even for
straightforward tasks we could achieve significant reductions in cheater rates by phrasing
the HIT in a non-repetitive way that discourages automation. Crowd filtering could be
shown to have significant impact on the observed cheater rates, while filtering by origin or
by means of a recruitment step were able to greatly reduce the amount of cheating, the
batch processing times multiplied. We are convinced that implicit crowd filtering through
task design is a superior means to cheat control than excluding more than 80% of the
available workers from accessing the HIT. An investigation of batch sizes further sup-
ported the hypothesis of fundamentally different worker motivations, as the observed
cheater rates for large batches that offer a high reuse potential, were significantly higher
than those for small batches.
Finally, our experiments confirmed that prior acceptance rates, although widely used,
cannot be seen as a robust measure of worker reliability. Recently, we have seen a change
in paradigms in this respect. In June 2011, Amazon introduced a novel service on AMT
that allows to issue HITs to an selected crowd of trusted workers, so-called Masters (at
higher fees). Master status is granted per task type and has to be maintained over time. For
example, as a worker reliably completes a high number of image tagging HITs, he will be
granted Master status for this particular task type. Currently, the available Master cate-
gories are ‘‘Photo Moderation’’ and ‘‘Categorization’’. Due to the recency of this devel-
opment, we were not able to set up a dedicated study of the performance-cost trade-off of
Master crowds versus regular ones.
Novel features like this raise an important general question to be addressed by future
work: Temporal instability is a major source of uncertainty in current crowdsourcing
research results. The crowdsourcing market is developing and changing at a high pace
and is connected to the economical situation outside the cloud. Therefore, it is not
obvious whether this year’s findings about worker behaviour, the general composition of
the crowd or HIT design would still hold two years from now. Besides empirical studies,
we see a clear need for explicit models of the crowd. If we could build a formal
representation of the global (or, depending on the application, local) crowd, including
incentives and external influences, we would have a reliable predictor of result quality,
process costs and required time at our fingertips, where currently the process is trial-and-
error-based.
One particularly interesting aspect of such a model of crowdsourcing lies in a better
understanding of worker motivation, gained for example through activity log analyses
and usage history, can solicit more sophisticated worker reliability models. To this end,
we are currently investigating the use of games in commercial crowdsourcing tasks.
There are different fundamental motivations for offering one’s labour on a crowd-
sourcing platform. Following previous experience, we hypothesise that workers who are
mainly entertainment-driven and for whom the financial reward only plays a subordinate
role, are less likely to cheat during the task. Using games, such workers can be
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rewarded more appropriately by representing HITs in engaging and entertaining
ways. Ultimately, this should lead to better results and greater cost-efficiency of
crowdsourcing.
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Appendix
See Figs. 3 and 4.
Fig. 3 Relevance judgement HIT
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